Democracy and the preservation of minority identity: fragmentation within the European human rights framework by Berry, Stephanie
Democracy and the preservation of minority identity: 
fragmentation within the European human rights framework
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Berry, Stephanie (2017) Democracy and the preservation of minority identity: fragmentation within 
the European human rights framework. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 24 
(3). pp. 205-228. ISSN 1385-4879 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/68472/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
Pre-publication version 
 (2017) 24(3) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
Democracy and the Preservation of Minority Identity: 
Fragmentation within the European Human Rights Framework 
 
Stephanie E. Berry 
Abstract 
The international human rights (IHR) and international minority rights (IMR) regimes 
have very different origins. However, the two regimes converged in the 20th century, 
and IMR are now understood to be a sub-regime of IHR. This article argues that the 
different historical origins of the two regimes impact how actors within each regime 
interpret their mission, and have resulted in institutional fragmentation within the 
Council of Europe. The mission of the European Court of Human Rights is the 
promotion and protection of democracy, whereas the Advisory Committee to the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minority’s mission is the 
preservation of minority identity. In practice, this has led to conflicting interpretations 
of multi-sourced equivalent norms. It is suggested that inter-institutional dialogue 
provides an avenue through which these conflicting interpretations can be mediated. 
Keywords 
fragmentation; minority rights; European Convention on Human Rights; Framework 
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1 Introduction 
While the international human rights (IHR) regime was founded in the aftermath of 
the Second World War with a view to preventing a repeat of the atrocities witnessed 
in that context,1 international minority rights (IMR) have historically been understood 
as a conflict prevention mechanism and have existed in international law, in various 
forms, since the Peace Treaties of the 16th and 17th centuries. 2 Despite these different 
historical origins, at an international level, the IHR and IMR regimes3 converged in                                                              
* Lecturer in Public Law, University of Sussex, Falmer, UK s.e.berry@sussex.ac.uk. All URLs were 
visited on 7 April 2017. The author would like to thank Alex Conte, Edward Guntrip, Adamantia 
Rachovitsa and Kenneth Veitch for their feedback on  earlier drafts of this paper. This article is 
based on a paper presented at the European Society of International Law 12th Annual Conference, 
Riga, 8-11 September 2016. 
1 Statement of Mr Malik (Lebanon) in GA, 145th Plenary Meeting 27 September 1948 U.N. doc 
A/PV.145, p.189. 
2  The Peace of Augsberg 1555; The Peace of Westphalia 1648; G. Pentasuglia Minorities in 
International Law: An Introductory Study (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2002) p. 
25.  
3 “[R]egimes are sets of norms, decision-making procedures and organisations coalescing around 
functional issue-areas”. M. Young, ‘Introduction: The Productive Fiction between Regimes’, in 
M.A. Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (CUP, 
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the 20th century and, in terms of both normative content4 and institutional mandate5 
significant overlap can be observed. Specifically, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights contains a minority rights provision.6 The only legally binding 
IMR instrument, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM),7  falls within the auspices of the Council of Europe and is understood to be 
an IHR instrument. Yet, IMR standards have also been elaborated by the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the aim of preventing ethnic conflict.8 
Thus, IMR do not always fit squarely within the broader IHR framework.  
 This article explores fragmentation within the Council of Europe between the 
specialised FCNM and the generalist European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).9  Both instruments contain analogous norms10 and pursue the goals of 
‘international peace and security’, and ‘liberal justice’.11 Nonetheless, this article 
argues that fragmentation has arisen between the institutions tasked with 
implementing these instruments, the Advisory Committee to the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC-FCNM) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Specifically, the different historical origins of IHR 
and IMR have influenced the “behaviours, assumptions and biases”12 of actors within 
each institution. This has resulted in the evolution of different institutional missions: 
the ECtHR views democracy as central to the achievement of the goals of the ECHR, 
whereas, the AC-FCNM views the preservation of minority identity as central to the 
achievement of the goals of the FCNM. Thus, while goals pertain to the purpose of 
specific instruments, missions pertain to how the institutions tasked with their 
implementation understand that these goals are to be achieved in practice. The 
identified diverging missions of the AC-FCNM and ECtHR have resulted in 
institutional fragmentation, that is, conflicting interpretations of multi-sourced 
equivalent norms (MSENs).13                                                                                                                                                                                
Cambridge, 2012) p. 11 
4 See, for example, Articles 7, 8, 9, 10 FCNM and Articles 9, 10, 11 ECHR.  
5 The Council of Europe and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
6 Article 27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 
23 March 1976. See also, UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities U.N. doc. A/RES/47/135. 
7 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities CETS No 157, entered into force 1 
February 1998 [FCNM]. 
8 See, for example, OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, ‘The Hague Recommendations 
Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities and Explanatory Note’ (October 1996); 
OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, ‘The Lund Recommendations on the 
Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life and Explanatory Note’ (September 
1999); OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, ‘The Ljubljana Guidelines on 
Integration of Diverse Societies & Explanatory Note’ (November 2012).  
9 European Convention on Human Rights opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 
Eur. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR]. 
10 The fundamental freedoms, the prohibition on discrimination and a right to preserve a way of life. 
11 Preamble ECHR; Preamble FCNM. 
12 Young , supra note 3,  p. 11. 
13 MSENs are “two or more norms which are (1) binding upon the same legal subjects; (2) similar or 
identical in their normative content; and (3) have been established through different international 
instruments or “legislative” procedures or are applicable in different substantive areas of the 
law”. T. Broude and Y. Shany, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent 
Norms’ in T. Broude and Y. Shany (eds.), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) p. 5.  
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By identifying the potential systemic causes of institutional fragmentation between 
the ECtHR and AC-FCNM and evaluating the direct impact of these factors on the 
interpretation of MSENs, this article sheds light on an unexplored aspect of the 
relationship between the two institutions. While some divergence between generalist 
and specialised regimes is to be expected, in this instance, the ECtHR’s prioritisation 
of majoritarian democracy undermines the preservation of minority identity.  This is 
problematic because States are likely to prioritise the least onerous interpretation of 
their obligations.14 Thus, the interpretation of rights by the ECtHR has the potential to 
delegitimise the work of the AC-FCNM. Consequently, the reconciliation of the 
competing missions of the two regimes is desirable to prevent the ECtHR from 
becoming a hegemonic regime.  
This article first explores the potential causes of institutional fragmentation between 
the ECtHR and AC-FCNM, by identifying systemic divergence and unpacking how 
the historical origins of the two regimes impact the missions of the two institutions. 
Second, the implications of these missions for the interpretation of MSENs, in 
practice, is explored. While the two regimes converge in relation to ‘democratic 
rights’, significant divergence can be observed in relation to rights that pertain to the 
preservation of minority identity. Finally, this article considers whether it is possible 
to reconcile the missions of the ECtHR and AC-FCNM. While resort to the normal 
rules of treaty interpretation does not appear to be advantageous, the pragmatic 
approach of inter-institutional dialogue may hold some merit.  
2 Institutional Fragmentation: The ECtHR and AC-FCNM 
Fragmentation in the context of public international law usually denotes the 
development of incompatible norms within different treaties or specialised regimes.15 
IHR and IMR do not contain incompatible norms in this sense. In fact, the two 
instruments that form the focus of this article, the ECHR and FCNM, contain a 
number MSENs, including the fundamental freedoms, 16  the prohibition on 
discrimination17 and both encompass a right to preserve a way of life.18 Although this 
normative overlap reduces the potential for direct norm conflict, these standards 
“retain their separate existence”.19 Linxinski suggests that, in the context of IHR, 
“most of the variation is restricted to the bureaucratic and institutional apparatuses 
created by each of these instruments”. 20  Thus, despite the absence of directly                                                              
14 C. Charters, ‘Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms and the Legitimacy of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
under International Law’ Broude and Shany (eds.), supra note 136, p. 300. 
15 See generally, C.W. Jenks, ‘Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ 30 British Year Book of International 
Law (1953) 401-53; Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law (U.N. doc. A/CN.4/L.682) <legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf>. 
16 Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 FCNM; Articles 9, 10, 11 ECHR. 
17 Article 4 FCNM ; Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12 ECHR.  
18  Article 5 FCNM ; G. and E. v. Norway, 3 October 1983, ECtHR, Judgment, p. 35, 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74157>; Chapman v. United Kingdom, 18 January 2001, ECtHR, 
Judgment, para. 96, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59154>.  
19 A. Rachovitsa, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration in Human Rights Law - A Critical Appraisal’, 
forthcoming International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2017) p. 3 [accessed via First View].  
20 L. Linxinski, ‘Comparative International Human Rights Law: An Analysis of the Right to Private 
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conflicting norms, the potential for institutional fragmentation remains, if the ECtHR 
and AC-FCNM interpret MSENs incompatibly. A number of factors have the 
potential to result in institutional fragmentation, including “the distinct political, 
normative and institutional environments in which they function”.21 This section 
suggests that the causes of fragmentation between the AC-FCNM and ECtHR include 
the nature of the norms, the mandates of these institutions and, finally, the structural 
biases of actors within each institution. 
2.1 Norms and Mandates 
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the general nature of the ECHR, 
compared to the specialised nature of the FCNM impacts the scope and focus of the 
norms contained in each instrument. Although both the ECHR and FCNM contain 
‘binding’ norms, they are binding to different degrees. The ECHR contains justiciable 
minimum standards, whereas the FCNM contains ‘programmatic rights’ that permit 
States “a measure of discretion in the implementation”. 22 This has led to criticism of 
the FCNM on the basis that “it is not incisive enough to afford effective protection to 
minorities”.23 Although the sui generis nature of the ECHR24 has led the ECtHR to 
permit States a margin of appreciation, specifically in the context of the identified 
MSENs, 25 this pertains to the scope of the limitations clause rather than the scope and 
content of substantive rights.  Thus, while a number of the rights contained in the 
ECHR and FCNM appear to align, these distinctions ultimately mean that there can 
never be true normative equivalence. 
The nature of the standards contained in the ECHR and FCNM also influences the 
mandate of their respective monitoring bodies. The ECtHR is able to issue binding 
judgments. Yet, before it can consider a particular situation, an admissible case be 
brought before it. In practice this has prevented it from considering situations 
identified by the AC-FCNM as problematic.26 Furthermore, the ECtHR can only 
consider the individual circumstances of a case, rather than the general situation 
prevailing in a State. This can inhibit the identification of laws, policies and practices 
that are incompatible with Convention standards.27 The ECtHR’s mandate is also                                                                                                                                                                               
and Family Life across Human Rights “Jurisdictions”’ 32:2 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 
(2014) 99, p. 100. 
21 Broude and Shany, supra note 13, p. 8.  
22  Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and 
Explanatory Report (February 1995) H(1995)010 paras. 11 and 17. 
23 PACE, ‘Report on an additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and national 
minorities’, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 12879, 23 February 2012, para. 
21 <www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=13083&lang=en>.  
24 A. Drzemczewski ‘The Sui Generis Nature of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1980) 29 
ICLQ 54 at 54. 
25 S. E. Berry, ‘A Tale of Two Instruments: Religious Minorities and the Council of Europe’s Rights 
Regime’, 30:1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2012) pp. 19-22 
26  See, for example, Ouardiri v. Switzerland, 8 July 2011, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-504>; Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory 
Committee, Third Opinion on Switzerland (5 March 2013) ACFC/OP/III(2013)001 para. 63 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/switzerland>. 
27  V.C. v. Slovakia, 8 November 2011, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 177, 
<hudoc.ECHR.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107364> Cf. Council of Europe, 
Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on the Slovak  Republic (28 May 
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limited by the inherent nature of the adversarial process, which only identifies the 
border at which minimum standards are breached.28 States are not incentivised to 
improve human rights protection beyond the floor of rights established by the 
ECHR.29  
Although the rights contained in the FCNM are relatively weak, the AC-FCNM is 
able to maximise the content of these rights through the State reporting process.30 By 
assessing the prevailing situation in a State, the AC-FCNM is able to adopt a more 
holistic approach which facilitates the identification of on-going and potential 
situations of concern. Thus, the AC-FCNM adopts a more preventative role than the 
ECtHR. Nonetheless, its Opinions on State reports at best constitute ‘soft law’,31 as 
compared to the ECtHR’s binding legal interpretations. Yet, it can be argued that the 
AC-FCNM’s interpretation of the standards contained in the FCNM establishes a 
normative expectation.  
The identified distinctions between the nature of rights contained in the ECHR and 
FCNM and the mandates of their respective monitoring bodies can, in practice, result 
in different interpretations of MSENs. This is not problematic per se. If diverging 
interpretations can be explained by reference to factual differences such as  
institutional mandates, 32 they might not constitute legal fragmentation.33 Nonetheless, 
conflicting interpretations of MSENs can still undermine institutional legitimacy, 
coherence and transparency. In the given context, the minimalist interpretations of 
MSENs by the ECtHR have the potential to undermine the maximalist interpretations 
of similar provisions by the AC-FCNM, as States can use conflicting interpretations 
of MSENs to justify only complying with the least onerous interpretation of their 
obligations. 34  This danger is particularly acute as the AC-FCNM has a weak 
enforcement structure.35   
2.2 Structural Bias 
The interpretation of MSENs is influenced by the preferences of actors within each 
regime and, specifically, “what the relevant institution understands as its mission, its                                                                                                                                                                               
2010) ACFC/OP/III(2010)004, paras. 53-54, <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/slovak-republic>.   
28 E. Brems, ‘Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives’, 9:3 Human Rights Law Review 
(2009) p. 350. 
29 Ibid., p. 354. 
30 S. E. Berry, ‘The Siren’s Call? Exploring the Implications of an Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights on National Minorities’ 23:1 International Journal of Minority and 
Group Rights (2016) p. 7.  
31 R. Hofmann, ‘The Impact of International Norms on the Protection of National  Minorities in 
Europe: The Added Value and Essential Role of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities’, DH-MIN(2006)018, p. 27, 
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0
900001680097f38>. 
32 O. Salát, ‘Comparative Freedom of Assembly and the Fragmentation of International Human Rights 
Law’ 32:2 Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2014), p.153. 
33 M. Payandeh, ‘Fragmentation within international human rights law’, in M. Andenas and E. Bjorge 
(eds.), A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015), p. 307.  
34 Charters, supra note 149, p. 300.  
35 G. Alfredsson, ‘A Frame an Incomplete Painting: Comparison of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities with International Standards and Monitoring Procedures’ 7:4 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2000) pp. 291-304.   
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structural bias”.36 This section argues that the missions of the AC-FCNM and ECtHR  
are informed by the historical origins and goals of their respective instruments. IMR 
originated purely as a conflict prevention mechanism, whereas, the IHR regime was 
founded in response to the broader atrocities committed during the Second World 
War. Nonetheless, the preambles to the IHR and IMR instruments of the 20th Century 
suggest that the two regimes are underpinned by similar and complementary goals: 
‘international peace and security’ and ‘liberal justice’. 37  While these goals are 
mutually reinforcing, the preambles to IMR instruments place more emphasis on 
‘international peace and security’ than IHR instruments. For example, the preamble to 
the FCNM highlights that “the upheavals of European history have shown that the 
protection of national minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and peace 
in this continent”. Although the goals underpinning IHR instruments are not 
necessarily static,38 this different emphasis, alongside the distinct historical origins of 
IHR and IMR, may lead the AC-FCNM and ECtHR to adopt divergent 
understandings of their respective missions. As this has the potential to result in 
institutional fragmentation, this section seeks to identify the missions of the AC-
FCNM and ECtHR. 
 
2.2.1 The Mission of the ECtHR 
Many of the rights contained in IHR instruments adopted in the aftermath of the 
Second World War can be traced to concepts of morality and natural law.39 Yet, the 
adoption of the instruments themselves was specifically motivated by the wish to 
maintain ‘international peace and security’. 40  In the context of the ECHR, democracy 
was understood to be the antidote to the threat posed to ‘international peace and 
security’ by “Fascism, Hitlerism and Communism”.41 The preamble, thus, establishes 
that the fundamental freedoms contained in the instrument “are best maintained ... by 
an effective political democracy”. As noted by Marks, “[a] bold line distinguished the 
democratic “we” from the totalitarian “they”, and a major, perhaps the major, aim of 
the Convention was now to keep things that way”. 42  This link between the 
achievement of the rights contained in the ECHR and democracy remains today. In 
the United Communist Party of Turkey case, the ECtHR “pointed out ... that the 
Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a 
                                                             
36 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ 70:1 The 
Modern Law Review (2007) p. 6. 
37 Preamble ECHR. See also, Preamble Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res. 217A (III), 
UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948); Preamble FCNM; Preamble UN Declaration on Minorities. 
38 G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007) p. 19. 
39 See generally, E. Bates, ‘History’, in D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran (eds.), International 
Human Rights Law 2nd Edition (OUP, Oxford, 2013) pp. 15-32; C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: 
Between Idealism and Realism 3rd Edition (OUP, Oxford 2014) p. 73. 
40 Letsas, supra note 38, p. 19. 
41 Statement of M Teitgen (France) Volume I: Preparatory Commission of the Council of Europe, 
Committee of Ministers Consultative Assembly 11 May-8 September 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1975) p. 40. 
42 S. Marks, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Its “Democratic Society”’ 66:1 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1996) 209, p. 210.  
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democratic society”.43 Consequently, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence suggests that it 
continues to understand its mission to be the protection of democracy in Europe. 
The centrality of democracy to the mission of the ECtHR notably finds expression 
in the MSENs found in Articles 8-11 ECHR. Limitations on these rights must be 
“necessary in a democratic society”. Further, States are permitted a margin of 
appreciation on the basis of democratic decision-making processes.44 However, the 
ECtHR adopts a ‘protective approach’ to ‘democratic rights’ such as the rights to 
freedom of expression;45 association and assembly;46 and the right to free and fair 
elections.47  Limitations must be evidenced to be strictly necessary and States are only 
permitted a narrow margin of appreciation.48 Democracy is, thus, central to the 
mission of the ECtHR and has underpinned its interpretation of rights.  
  
2.2.2 The Mission of the AC-FCNM 
The AC-FCNM's interpretation of its mission is connected to the specialised nature of 
the FCNM. The prospect of inter-ethnic violence at the end of the Cold War led the 
proliferation of minority rights instruments and bodies in the 1990s. Thus, it is not 
surprising that ‘international peace and security’ remains central to justificatory 
narratives underpinning the IMR regime. Nonetheless, the AC-FCNM has emphasised 
that “the spirit of the Framework Convention is much wider and goes beyond conflict 
prevention”.49 The approach of the AC-FCNM suggests that the FCNM continues to 
be underpinned by the complementary goals of ‘security’ and ‘justice’.50 The key 
distinction between the ECtHR and AC-FCNM arises in relation to how these goals 
are understood to be best achieved - that is the mission of the institutions. The 
consistent narrative underpinning IMR, including the FCNM, suggests that the 
mission of the AC-FCNM is the preservation of minority identity. This dates back to 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, which linked the preservation of 
minority identity to “the possibility of living peaceably”.51 The AC-FCNM has, 
notably, recognised that States and the media often portray minority identity a threat, 
                                                             
43 United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 
45 <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58128>. See, further, J.-P. Costa, ‘The links between 
democracy and human rights under the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Helsinki, (5 June 2008) p. 1 
<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20080605_Costa_Helsinki_ENG.pdf>. 
44 R. Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’ 14 
Human Rights Law Review (2014) p. 499. 
45 Article 10 ECHR. 
46 Article 11 ECHR. 
47 Article 3, Protocol 1 ECHR.  
48 J.-P. Costa, ‘Protection of the Democratic Values in Administration of Justice’, Baku, 2 May 2008 
cited in H.-M. ten Napel, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Political Rights: The Need 
for More Guidance’ 5 European Constitutional Law Review (2009) 464, p. 478.  
49 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Opinion on Georgia, (19 March 
2009) ACFC/OP/I(2009)001 para. 59 <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/georgia>. 
50 E. Craig, ‘From Security to Justice? The Development of a More Justice-Oriented Approach to the 
Realisation of European Minority Rights Standards’ 30 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
(2012) pp. 40-64. 
51 Minority Schools in Albania, PCIJ Series A./B. Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1935, p. 17. 
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either to society52 or the preservation of the majority’s identity,53 in order to legitimise 
human rights violations.54 However, it has emphasised that interference with the rights 
of minorities on the basis of a perceived threat often prove to be counter-productive 
and undermine attempts at building peace. 55 If the goals of the regime are to be 
achieved, then the logic of IMR dictates that States must not attempt to assimilate 
minorities or unnecessarily interfere with their cultural, linguistic or religious 
practices. The mission of the AC-FCNM is, accordingly, the preservation of minority 
identity.  
2.3 The Causes of Institutional Fragmentation: The ECtHR and AC-FCNM 
A number of factors have been identified that have the potential to result in 
institutional fragmentation in the interpretation of MSENs by the ECtHR and AC-
FCNM. While the ECHR and FCNM both pursue the goals of 'international peace and 
security’ and ‘liberal justice’ (albeit with a different emphasis), there is a significant 
divergence in how the institutions tasked with implementing these instruments 
understand these goals are to be achieved. The ECtHR interprets its mission to be the 
protection of democracy, whereas the AC-FCNM interprets its mission to be the 
preservation of minority identity.  
This divergence is not inherently problematic and will not automatically result in 
institutional fragmentation between the ECtHR and AC-FCNM. As suggested by 
Payandeh, “[s]uch a structural bias is … not only understandable but also legitimate, 
since it is the basic raison d’être of specialized human rights regimes”. 56 Yet, if the 
priorities of one institution collide rather than align with the priorities of the other 
institution, the ensuing fragmentation has the potential to not only impact the 
coherence of the IHR regime but also to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of the weaker regime. 
3 MSENs and Institutional Fragmentation in Practice 
Having established that the respective missions of the ECtHR and the AC-FCNM 
diverge, this section proceeds to consider whether this has resulted in institutional 
fragmentation, in practice, by reviewing the interpretation of MSENs in analogous                                                              
52 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on Bulgaria (11 
February 2014) ACFC/OP/III(2014)001 para. 67 <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/bulgaria>; Council 
of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Fourth Opinion on Denmark (20 May 2014) 
ACFC/OP/IV(2014)001 para. 64 <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/denmark>. 
53 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on Estonia (1 April 
2011) ACFC/OP/III(2011)004 para. 76 <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/estonia>; Council of Europe, 
Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Second Opinion on Latvia, ACFC/OP/II(2013)001 paras 
63 and 80 <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/latvia>.  
54 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Fourth Opinion on Spain (3 
December 2014) ACFC/OP/IV(2014) 003 para. 42 <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/spain>; Council of 
Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on Kosovo (6 March 2013) 
ACFC/OP/III(2013)002 paras. 91, 167 <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/unmik/kosovo>. 
55 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (7 March 2013) ACFC/OP/III(2013)003 para. 90 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/bosnia-and-herzegovina>. 
56 Payandeh, supra note 33, p. 318.  
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situations in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and the AC-FCNM’s Opinions on State 
reports. The identified MSENs map on to the missions of the ECtHR and AC-FCNM 
and, thus, can either be broadly categorised as democratic rights, that is the right to 
freedom of expression, association and assembly; and rights that facilitate the 
preservation of minority identity, the right to manifest religion and the right to ‘a way 
of life’. Notably, from the perspective of the AC-FCNM all identified rights pertain to 
the preservation of minority identity. It is argued that institutional fragmentation has 
resulted from the interpretation of MSENs by the AC-FCNM and ECtHR, as each 
institution prioritises its own mission. The identified fragmentation is significant, 
because although MSENs have the potential to be mutually reinforcing if interpreted 
consistently, 57 it can undermine the legitimacy of regimes if they are not.  
3.1 Democratic Rights  
The ECtHR has consistently emphasised the link between democracy and the 
freedoms of expression, association and assembly. In Fressoz and Roire, the ECtHR 
recognised that, “[f]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations 
of a democratic society”.58 Furthermore, it has stressed that the link between Articles 
10 and 11 ECHR “applies all the more in relation to political parties in view of their 
essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy”.59 On 
the basis of the connection between these rights and democracy, the ECtHR has only 
permitted States a narrow margin of appreciation. 60  
Moreover, the AC-FCNM has emphasised the connection between democracy and 
effective minority rights protection. For example, in relation to article 15 FCNM, it 
has noted that “[t]he degree of participation of persons belonging to national 
minorities in all spheres of life can be considered as one of the indicators of the level 
of pluralism and democracy of a society”.61 This pluralist understanding of democracy 
aligns with that of the ECtHR, which has reiterated that “there can be no democracy 
without pluralism”. 62  Significantly, the ECtHR’s interpretation of ‘a democratic 
society’ extends past simple majoritarian democracy 63  and embraces a pluralist 
conception that recognises the importance of minority participation.64 
States seeking to justify restrictions on the freedom of expression, association and 
assembly of minorities under the ECHR, often attempt to justify interference on the 
grounds of security, an area where States are usually permitted discretion. 65 Thus, 
Turkey has attempted to justify the proscription of Kurdish political parties and the                                                              
57 Broude and Shany, supra note 13, p. 9.  
58 Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21 January 1999, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 45, 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58906>. 
59 United Communist Party case, supra note 50, para. 43.  
60 Costa, supra note 48.  
61 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Commentary on the Effective 
Participation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social and Economic Life 
and in Public Affairs (5 May 2008) ACFC/31DOC(2008)001 para. 8, 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/thematic-commentaries>. 
62 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, 13 February 2003, ECtHR, Judgment, para 
89, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60936>.  
63 G. van der Schyff, ‘The concept of democracy as an element of the European Convention’ 28 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa (2005) p. 356. 
64 Ten Napel, supra note 48, p. 467.  
65 Letsas, supra note 38, p. 91.  
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prohibition of expressions that profess support for the Kurdish cause, on the basis that 
they support or pose a terrorist threat, 66 pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the 
State67 and the democratic order. 68 Despite the seriousness of these claims, the 
ECtHR has consistently found violations of Articles 10 and 11 ECHR on the basis 
that the interference undermines democracy.69  Specifically, in United Community 
Party v Turkey, the ECtHR held that  
[d]emocracy thrives on freedom of expression. From that point of view, there can 
be no justification for hindering a political group solely because it seeks to debate 
in public the situation of part of the State’s population and to take part in the 
nation’s political life in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions 
capable of satisfying everyone concerned.70  
Unless States are able prove that the applicant poses the asserted threat to 
democracy,71 the ECtHR has consistently prioritised the protection of the democratic 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.  
 Similarly, the AC-FCNM has expressed concern when States have sought to 
restrict political parties on the basis that they represent ethnic, national or religious 
minorities or specific territories.72 While recognising that such laws may be designed 
to reduce tensions and the potential for conflict, the AC-FCNM has expressed 
dissatisfaction when the “prohibition is so broad that it could limit legitimate activities 
aimed at the protection of national minorities by political parties”.73 The AC-FCNM 
has specifically linked democratic rights to the goal of security. Thus, it has 
emphasised that minority political parties “make it possible for the concerns and 
interests of persons belonging to national minorities ... a factor that would contribute 
far more constructively than prohibition to fostering peaceful co-existence”.74 Outside 
the political arena, both the AC-FCNM and ECtHR have interpreted ‘democratic 
rights’ to encompass elements of the right to preserve minority identity through 
expression, association and assembly, despite the portrayal of minority identity as a                                                              
66  Socialist Party and others v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 38 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58172>. 
67 United Communist Party case, supra note 43, para. 40; Ceylan v. Turkey, 8 July 1999, ECtHR, 
Judgment para. 27 <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58270>. 
68 United Communist Party case, supra note 43, para. 49; 
69 See for example, ibid; Ceylan case, supra note 67; Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey, 8 July 1999, 
ECtHR, Judgment, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58278>; Ürper and others v. Turkey, 20 
October 2010, ECtHR, Judgment, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-95201>. 
70 United Communist Party case, supra note 43, para. 57. 
71 Etxeberría and others v. Spain, 30 June 2009, ECtHR, Judgment, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-
1509>; Herri Batasuna and Batassuna v. Spain, 30 June 2009, ECtHR, Judgment, 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-93475>. Cf. Refah Partisi, supra note 62, para. 104, which 
concerned the proscription of an Islamic political party. On the basis that there was a real and 
imminent prospect of the party being elected, the ECtHR adopted a less stringent evidentiary test.  
72 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Second Opinion on the Russian 
Federation (11 May 2006) ACFC/OP/II(2006)004 para. 162 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/russian-federation>; Council of Europe, Framework Convention 
Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on Moldova (26 June 2009) ACFC/OP/III(2009)003 para. 97 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/republic-of-moldova>. 
73 Second Opinion on the Russian Federation,ibid. 
74 Third Opinion on Bulgaria, supra note 52, para. 82.  
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threat in these cases.75 
The primary divergence between the AC-FCNM and ECtHR relates to structural 
discrimination. The AC-FCNM has not only “encourage[d] the authorities to design 
measures to improve the representation of national minorities in elected bodies, 
especially at national level”,76 but has also identified the potential for structural 
discrimination to leave minorities with little choice but to resort to non-democratic 
means in order to be heard. 77 In contrast, the ECtHR has failed to identify that the 
design of democratic systems may serve to exclude minority parties,78 despite this 
undermining the pluralism that it recognises to be central to democratic societies. 
More generally, the AC-FCNM has emphasised that restrictions on democratic rights 
are often underpinned by discrimination and securitized portrayals of minority 
political consciousness. It has expressed particular concern when minority rights 
advocates are convicted for high-treason, 79  and accused of being ‘traitors’, 
‘extremists’ and ‘enemies of the government’. 80  In contrast, the ECtHR has 
consistently declined to consider whether the interference with the applicants’ 
democratic rights was discriminatory.81 In so doing, it fails to expressly acknowledge 
the aggravated nature of these violations and that States seek to legitimise rights 
violations by portraying minority identity and consciousness as a threat.  
The AC-FCNM and ECtHR have, for the most part, interpreted MSENs that pertain 
to democracy in a compatible manner. A degree of divergence can be detected in the 
approach to discriminatory State practices. Yet these differences do not automatically 
suggest that there is fragmentation between the ECtHR and AC-FCNM. The 
specialised nature of the FCNM has arguably resulted in the AC-FCNM being more 
attuned to the specific issues that face minorities, as compared to the generalist 
ECtHR.  
3.2 The Preservation of Minority Identity 
As one of the two pillars of minority protection,82 the preservation of minority identity 
is integral to the realisation of the rights contained in the FCNM and the mission of 
the AC-FCNM.83 While no express right to preserve minority identity exists in the                                                              
75  Sidiropoulos and others v. Greece, 10 July 1998, ECtHR, Judgment, paras. 44-47 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58205>; Association Ekin v. France, 17 July 2001, ECtHR, 
Judgment, para. 63, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59603>; Gorzelik and others v. Poland, 17 
February 2004, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 93, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61637>; Second 
Opinion on the Russian Federation, supra note 72, paras. 157-161; Council of Europe, 
Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on Azerbaijan (10 October 2012) 
ACFC/OP/III(2012)005 para. 66, <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/azerbaijan>.  
76 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Second Opinion on Armenia (12 
May 2006) ACFC/OP/II(2006)005 para. 133 <http://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/armenia>. 
77 Third Opinion on Bulgaria, supra note 52. 
78 Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, 8 July 2008, ECtHR, Judgment, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges 
Tulkens, Vajić, Jaeger and Šikuta para. 5 <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87363>.  
79 Third Opinion on Azerbaijan, supra note 75. 
80 Ibid., paras. 50, 60; Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion 
on the Russian Federation (24 November 2011) ACFC/OP/III(2011)010 para. 132 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/russian-federation>. 
81 United Communist Party case, supra note 43, para. 62; Sidiropoulos case, supra note 75, para. 52; 
Association Ekin case, supra note 75, para. 65; Ceylan case, supra note 67, paras. 39- 42. 
82 Minority Schools in Albania case, supra note 51. 
83 Article 5 FCNM 
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ECHR, such a right is implicitly contained in Articles 8 and 9 ECHR.84 Both 
institutions have identified that majorities often seek to restrict the preservation of 
minority identity. Notably, the AC-FCNM has recognised that this may be motivated 
by a perceived threat to societal culture of the majority.85  Furthermore, the ECtHR 
has established that “democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority 
must always prevail”.86 However, in practice, the ECtHR has permitted States a wide 
margin of appreciation to limit these MSENs, an approach that prioritises majoritarian 
democracy above the right of minorities to preserve their identity.  
The AC-FCNM has been particularly cognisant that majority opposition to the 
expression of minority identity may be underpinned by a perceived threat: “Muslims, 
report that there is little understanding and knowledge in society in general of their 
religion, which is sometimes aggravated by increased stereotyping in society of 
Muslims as extremists. These hostile attitudes can infringe the freedom to manifest 
one’s religion or belief, as protected by Article 8 of the Framework Convention.”87 
Majoritarian intolerance against hijab wearing Muslim women has been identified by 
the AC-FCNM as discriminatory and undermining the right to preserve minority 
identity.88 Moreover, it rejected the UK’s argument that limitations on the wearing of 
the niqab in State schools were justified on the grounds of security.89 Instead it 
encouraged the government to consult religious minorities before adopting restrictive 
policies,90 in order to reduce the potential for majoritarian intolerance to interfere with 
the preservation of minority identity. 
In contrast, the ECtHR has consistently accepted that manifestations of Islam pose a 
threat to societal values such as gender equality and secularism.91 Most notably, the 
ECtHR has permitted States a wide margin of appreciation to restrict religious 
manifestations on the basis that secularism is a founding principle of the democratic 
State.92  In practice, this means that the ECtHR accepts the legitimacy of the 
interference with the applicant’s rights without evidence of the threat posed.93  Thus, 
the margin of appreciation has led democratic values to be prioritised above the right                                                              
84 Berry, supra note 30, pp. 9-11. 
85 Third Opinion on Estonia, supra note 53, para 76. 
86 Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 63, 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57608>. 
87 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on Ukraine (22 
March 2012) ACFC/OP/III(2012)002, para. 84 <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/ukraine>. 
88 Third Opinion on the Russian Federation, supra note 80, paras. 91 and 151; Council of Europe, 
Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on Spain (22 March 2012) 
ACFC/OP/III(2012)003, para. 75, <www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/spain>.   
89 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Second Opinion on the United 
Kingdom (26 October 2007) ACFC/OP/II(2007)003, paras. 158, 161, 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/united-kingdom>.   
90 Ibid., para. 161.   
91  Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 February 2001 ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-22643>; Şahin v. Turkey, 10 November 2005, ECtHR, Judgment, 
paras. 114-15 <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70956>; Dogru v. France, 4 December 2008, 
ECtHR, Judgment, para. 72, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90039>. 
92 Dogru case, ibid., para. 72. 
93 Dahlab case, supra note 91; Şahin case, supra note 91, Dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens para. 8; 
Dogru case, ibid., para. 44; Ebrahimian v. France, 26 November 2016, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 
71, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159070>. 
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of religious minorities to manifest their religion. The only instance in which the 
ECtHR has found a violation in a case concerning the right of Muslim women to wear 
the hijab, related to the requirement that an elected official remove the hijab in order 
to take up office. In Kavakçi v Turkey, the ECtHR prioritised the democratic will of 
the people above the secular nature of State institutions under Article 3 Protocol 1 
ECHR. 94 This evidences the central role played by democracy in the ECtHR's 
interpretation of rights. 
The ECtHR has been willing to defer to democratic decision-making process, even 
when such processes appear to disclose majoritarian intolerance. Thus, in Buckley v 
United Kingdom, the ECtHR deferred to the decisions of the local planning 
authorities, despite the apparent prejudice against travellers that had underpinned the 
decision-making process.95 Furthermore, the perceived failure of Muslim minorities 
to integrate and the threat this poses to societal security has also been invoked to 
justify limitations on the right to manifest religion.96 Specifically, in SAS v France, 
the ECtHR deferred to the State’s margin of appreciation, on the basis that the burqa 
ban was adopted following a democratic process.97 However, it also expressly noted 
that the democratic process gave expression to majoritarian intolerance and served to 
ostracise the Muslim minority. 98  The majoritarian interpretation of democracy 
adopted by the ECtHR in these cases is, notably, inconsistent with the pluralist vision 
that it promotes under democratic rights. 
In direct contrast, the AC-FCNM has recognised that the failure to provide 
appropriate stopping sites for travellers in the UK has the potential to result in or 
exacerbate tensions and conflict between minority and majority and, thus, undermine 
the goal of security. 99 It has also identified that the portrayal of minority identity as a 
threat has the potential to result in interference with rights. Consequently, it has 
clearly stated “that any limitation of rights of persons belonging to national minorities 
through majority decisions such as referenda contradicts the very essence of the 
Framework Convention”.100 The AC-FCNM has further recognised that majoritarian 
intolerance creates insecurity amongst the minority in question, which has the 
potential to have a ‘freezing effect’ on the exercise of minority rights.101 Therefore,                                                              
94 Kavakçi v. Turkey, 5 April 2007, ECtHR, Judgment, paras. 43-46, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
80024>. 
95 ‘I consider it important to keep concentrations of sites for gypsies small, because in this way they are 
more readily accepted by the local community’. Buckley v. United Kingdom, 29 September 1996, 
ECtHR, Judgment, para. 80 <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58076>. For further analysis, see, R. 
Sandland, ‘Developing a Jurisprudence of Difference: The Protection of the Human  Rights of 
Travelling Peoples by the European Court of Human Rights’, 8 Human Rights Law Review 
(2008) p. 483. 
96 SAS v. France, 1 July 2014, ECtHR, Judgment, paras, 121-22 <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
145466>; Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 10 January 2017, ECtHR, Judgment, paras. 
96-7 <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170436>. 
97 SAS case, ibid., para. 154. 
98 Ibid., para 149. 
99 Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Third Opinion on the United 
Kingdom (30 June 2011) ACFC/OP/III(2011)006, para. 89 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/united-kingdom>. 
100 Second Opinion on Latvia, supra note 53, para. 71  
101  Council of Europe, Framework Convention Advisory Committee, Opinion on Kosovo (25 
November 2005, ACFC/OP/I(2005)004 para. 62 
<www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/unmik/kosovo>. 
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the AC-FCNM has emphasised that it is the role of the State to improve intercultural 
understanding rather than restricting the rights of minorities on the basis of the 
prejudice of the majority.102 This approach aims to reduce interference with the 
identity of minorities on the basis of a perceived threat.  
Fragmentation has occurred between the ECtHR and AC-FCNM in the 
interpretation of MSENs that pertain to the preservation of minority identity. This can 
be attributed to the diverging missions of the two bodies. The AC-FCNM has 
expressly recognised that democratic decision-making has the potential to legitimise 
the intolerance of the majority and undermine the right of minorities to preserve their 
identity. Rather than pandering to the prejudice of the majority, the AC-FCNM 
requires that States adopt measures to reduce intolerance. In contrast, the ECtHR, in 
accordance with its mission, has prioritised majoritarian democracy through the 
margin of appreciation ahead of the right of minorities to preserve their identity. Yet, 
as noted by Benvenisti “[a]cquiescing to the margin of appreciation of national 
institutions ... assists the majorities in burdening politically powerless minorities”.103 
The ECtHR’s interpretation of rights pertaining to the preservation of minority 
identity undermines the mission of the AC-FCNM. 
4 Reconciling the Competing Missions of the AC-FCNM and ECtHR 
This article has established that the diverging missions of the AC-FCNM and the 
ECtHR, have resulted in fragmentation in the interpretation of MSENs pertaining to 
the preservation of minority identity. While fragmentation is not always problematic, 
in this instance, the ECtHR has undermined both the raison d’être of the FCNM and 
the legitimacy of the AC-FCNM. Thus, this section explores the potential for 
reconciling the competing missions of the AC-FCNM and ECtHR.   
As there is no automatic hierarchy between regimes in international law, reference 
should be made to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the 
concept of systemic integration to determine which regime should be given priority in 
cases of fragmentation. However, as is revealed in this section, these principles do not 
provide an adequate framework to resolve the identified fragmentation between the 
AC-FCNM and ECtHR, due to the nature of the systemic differences. Instead, it is 
argued that actors within the two regimes should turn to inter-institutional dialogue in 
order to mitigate the impact of their diverging missions.  
It is important to emphasise at the outset that uniformity of interpretation is not 
necessarily desirable. Contextual factors, including, the type of norms and the 
mandates of the two institutions, are likely to continue to result in disparate 
interpretations of MSENs. 104 In the context of IHR, uniformity is not necessarily 
desirable as it has the potential to prioritise Western hegemonic interpretations of 
rights and undermine pluralism. 105  Indeed, an approach that favours complete 
uniformity is likely to prioritise the interpretations emanating from generalist human 
rights bodies and disregard the raison d’être of specialised regimes, the development                                                              
102 Second Opinion on Latvia, supra note 53, para. 74. 
103 E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’, 31 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics (1998-1999) p. 847.  
104 Rachovitsa, supra note 19, p. 12.  
105 Linxinski, supra note 20, p. 112. 
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of subject-specific expertise. Nonetheless, conflicting interpretations of MSENs 
remain problematic as they can undermine the legitimacy of a regime and lead to non-
compliance with the most onerous interpretation of standards.106  
Article 30(2) VCLT establishes that “[w]hen a treaty specifies that it is subject to, 
or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the 
provisions of that other treaty prevail”.  To this end, Articles 19 and 23 FCNM afford 
priority to the ECHR in relation to both the interpretation of substantive rights and the 
scope of permissible limitations and derogations. This eliminates the need to consult 
the principles of lex posterior and lex specialis,107  which would afford priority to the 
provisions of the FCNM as the more recent and specialised instrument. Nonetheless, 
this should not afford the ECHR absolute priority over the FCNM. As noted 
previously, there can never be true normative equivalence due to the different nature 
of the rights contained in the ECHR and FCNM. Furthermore, the mandates of the 
AC-FCNM and ECtHR mean that these rights are not interpreted in comparable 
contexts. It is also of note that the ECtHR is not bound by these clauses and, therefore, 
is able to defer to the AC-FCNM’s interpretation of MSENs, should it so wish.  
Complete deference to the ECtHR’s interpretation of MSENs is also undesirable as 
it has the potential to establish the Court as a hegemonic regime. While there is 
theoretically no hierarchy between IHR treaties, the ECHR system is often perceived 
to the most successful and powerful.108 Indeed, the priority afforded to the ECHR in 
Article 23 FCNM reflects the position of the ECHR within the Council of Europe 
system, as the primary and founding document. Yet, it would be counterintuitive for 
Article 23 FCNM to require that the AC-FCNM adopt an interpretation of an MSEN 
that directly undermines its mission. Thus, while the drafters of the FCNM attempted 
to avoid fragmentation between the ECHR and FCNM by prioritising the ECHR, in 
practice, this clause is too crude to reconcile the diverging missions of the AC-FCNM 
and ECtHR.  
Systemic integration is perhaps a more nuanced method for reconciling conflicting 
interpretations of MSENs.109 Article 31(3)(c) VCLT establishes, in relation to the 
interpretation of treaty provisions, that, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together 
with the context: . . . (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties”. Former President Costa of the ECtHR, has suggested 
that judges in the ECtHR are aware that the “Convention is not a solitary instrument, 
but one element in a broader constellation of conventions and other texts developed 
by the Council of Europe”. 110 Indeed, the ECtHR has, in practice, referred to the 
interpretation of MSENs by other human rights bodies particularly specialised 
regimes. 111 Yet, although systemic integration appears to be a promising mechanism                                                              
106 Charters, supra note 14, p. 300.  
107 R. Michaels and J. Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws? Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of International Law’, in Young (ed.), supra note 3, pp. 33-5.  
108 See for example, E. Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From Its 
Inception to the Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (OUP 2010) p. 2.  
109 See generally, C. McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ 54:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005) pp. 279-320.  
110 Costa, supra note 43, p. 2. 
111 See generally, A. Rachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of International Law Revisited: Insights, Good 
Practices, and Lessons to be Learned from the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ 28 Leiden Journal of International Law (2015) pp. 863-885; M. Forowicz, ‘Factors 
influencing the reception of international law in the ECtHR’s case law: an overview’, in Andenas 
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to reconcile the conflicting interpretation of MSENs by the AC-FCNM and ECtHR, 
this also raises a number of difficulties. Charters has, for example, noted that when 
instruments are subject to evolutive interpretation, systemic integration may aggravate 
rather than relieve uncertainty because interpretations are not static. 112  The 
programmatic nature of the rights contained in the FCNM exacerbates this uncertainty 
and, therefore, has the potential to undermine any attempt at reconciling the 
interpretation of MSENs. Furthermore, Council of Europe States have consistently 
refused to adopt an Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
on National Minorities.113 Thus, the use of systemic integration to bring minority 
rights within the jurisdiction of the ECtHR is likely to be viewed as inappropriate.114 
Indeed, historically, the ECtHR has been reluctant to refer to the FCNM, on the basis 
of a lack of consensus on the issue.115 
Nonetheless, the majority of States party to the ECHR have now ratified the 
FCNM116 and the ECtHR has on occasion referred to the AC-FCNM’s Opinions in 
relation to a specific State in order to establish the prevailing situation and guide its 
reasoning.117 However, the ECtHR refers to the AC-FCNM selectively and in a 
manner that suggests that it does so to increase its own legitimacy rather than to 
improve the coherence of the system. For example, in DH and others, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR appears to have referred to the Opinions of the AC-FCNM 
because the original Chamber decision had been heavily criticised.118 Moreover, it is 
possible to identify other cases, such as V.C. v Slovakia, concerning the forced 
sterilisation of Roma women, where reference to the AC-FCNM’s Opinions on State 
Reports would have allowed the ECtHR to identify systematic discrimination, but the 
ECtHR failed to recognise their relevance.119   
It is also significant that the cases where the ECtHR has referred to the AC-FCNM 
did not relate to a perceived clash between democracy and the preservation of 
minority identity. In instances involving such a clash, systemic integration is likely to 
prove unhelpful. Rachovitsa warns that “the principle is still shaped by - and possibly 
reinforces - existing institutional preferences and biases”. 120 The diverging missions 
of the AC-FCNM and ECtHR are, therefore, likely to continue to influence how the 
two bodies interpret MSENs.121 Rather than enabling the specific expertise of the AC-                                                                                                                                                                              
and Bjorge (eds.), supra note 33, p.201. 
112 Charters, supra note 14, p. 315.  
113 See, generally, Berry, supra note 305, pp. 1-38. 
114 S. Wheatley, ‘Minorities under the ECHR and the construction of a “democratic society”’, Public 
Law (2007) pp. 778-79.  
115 Chapman case, supra note 18, para. 94.  
116 With the exception of Andorra, France, Monaco, Turkey (neither signed nor ratified) and Belgium, 
Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg (signed but not ratified). On the ratification point, see, further, 
Forowicz, supra note 112, p. 213. 
117 See, for example, D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, 13 November 2007, ECtHR, Judgment, 
paras. 134, 192, 200, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83256>; Oršuš and others v. Croatia, 16 
March 2010, ECtHR, Judgment, paras. 159-74 <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97689>.  
118 For criticism of the Chambers decision in this case, see further, M. Goodwin, ‘D.H. and Others v. 
Czech Republic: a major set-back for the development of non-discrimination norms in Europe’ 
7:4 German Law Journal (2006) pp. 421-431; Hofmann, supra note 31. 
119 V.C. case, supra note 27; Third Opinion on the Slovak Republic, supra note 27. For further 
discussion, see Berry, supra note 30, pp. 29-31. 
120 Rachovitsa, supra note 19, p. 4. 
121 Ibid., p. 19.  
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FCNM to be recognised and used to develop an interpretation of MSENs that 
reconciles the aims of democracy and the preservation of minority identity, systemic 
integration has the potential to reinforce the hegemony of the ECtHR.  
The rules developed within public international law may not be appropriate to 
address the institutional fragmentation that has evolved between the AC-FCNM and 
ECtHR. Consequently, it is necessary to explore more pragmatic approaches to 
resolve fragmentation. A number of authors have promoted inter-institutional (or 
judicial) dialogue as a means to resolve institutional fragmentation, without promoting 
complete uniformity and hegemony. 122  This includes reference to or 
acknowledgement of the work of other bodies in decision-making processes but can 
also include, for example, the establishment of fora to facilitate inter-institutional 
exchange and interaction. Such inter-institutional dialogue has the potential to reduce 
institutional fragmentation “by raising awareness of the practice of other bodies and 
clarifying the reasoning process”.123 It is notable that Gilbert has argued that the 
adoption of ‘National Minority Sensitive Guidelines’ within the ECtHR may enable 
greater consistency between the ECtHR and AC-FCNM.124 This author has expressed 
scepticism about this approach elsewhere,125 on the basis that the ECtHR is likely to 
continue to assert its own institutional competence ahead of that of the AC-FCNM, 
despite the latter’s expertise. Thus, this approach has the potential to permit the 
ECtHR to continue to only refer to the AC-FCNM when it perceives that it would be 
advantageous to do so from the perspective of its own legitimacy. 126 If this were the 
case, then inter-institutional dialogue runs the risk of increasing the hegemony of the 
ECtHR. However, should a non-hegemonic starting point be identified, then the 
establishment of a mechanism to facilitate inter-institutional dialogue displays 
promise as a way to reconcile the competing missions of these two bodies. 
Importantly such an approach does not seek to promote entirely uniform 
interpretations of MSENs across institutions, for the reasons previously outlined. A 
key element, however, is “sensitivity to jurisdictional overlap and the inclusion of 
justifications”.127 This requires that interpreting institutions clarify the reasoning 
process and explain contextual differences that have led to apparently inconsistent 
interpretations of MSENs. Were the ECtHR to cogently justify a divergent 
interpretation of a MSEN by reference to the nature of the norms contained in the 
ECHR as compared to the FCNM and its mandate as compared to that of the AC-
FCNM, it is possible to avoid legal fragmentation. Both interpretations would remain 
valid and States could not refer to the ECtHR’s judgments in order to justify non-
compliance with the recommendations of the AC-FCNM, if they have accepted the 
complementary competence of both institutions through ratification. Thus, inter-
institutional dialogue may prevent the ECtHR from undermining the legitimacy and 
authority of the AC-FCNM.  
The establishment of a formal mechanism such as an inter-institutional working                                                              
122 Charters, supra note 14, p. 304; Linxinski, supra note 20, p. 102; P. Webb, ‘Factors influencing 
fragmentation and convergence in international courts’, in Andenas and Bjorge (eds.), supra note 
33, p. 167. 
123 Webb, ibid.. 
124 G. Gilbert, ‘Soft Solutions to a Hard Problem: Justiciable Minority Rights?’, 10 European Yearbook 
of Minority Issues (2011) p. 196. 
125 Berry, supra note 30, p. 34. 
126 Linxinski, supra note 20, p. 112. 
127 Charters, supra note 14, p. 313.  
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group, has the potential to provide a forum for the AC-FCNM and ECtHR to share 
information on the situation and challenges faced by minorities within Council of 
Europe member States. Actors within each institutions will become more aware of the 
work of the other institution and can seek clarification of diverging interpretations of 
MSENs. Over time, there is potential for this approach to result in improved 
understanding between the AC-FCNM and ECtHR and increased, but not complete, 
convergence in the interpretation of MSENs.  
Nonetheless, for such inter-institutional dialogue to be successful, actors within 
each regime must be willing to engage with and learn from their counterparts.  
Specifically, they must be open and aware of different perspectives. As noted by 
Lang, “regime interaction must in part be directed towards the destabilization of the 
‘principles of vision’”. 128  While the ECtHR currently displays unfloundering 
commitment to democracy, its interpretation of the requirements of democracy is 
inconsistent. The pluralist vision of democracy employed by the ECtHR in cases 
concerning democratic rights is consistent with the mission of the AC-FCNM. It is the 
majoritarian vision of democracy adopted under the margin of appreciation in cases 
pertaining to the preservation of minority identity that is problematic. Were the 
ECtHR to readjust its interpretation of democracy from a majoritarian to pluralist 
vision in these cases, the prospect of reconciling the ECHR and FCNM would be 
greatly improved. By providing a forum for the ECtHR and AC-FCNM to engage on 
these issues, inter-institutional dialogue has the potential to facilitate this change, by 
highlighting the implications of the ECtHR’s inconsistent approach to ‘democracy’ 
for the AC-FCNM.    
 
5 Conclusion 
While the ECHR and FCNM both pursue the goals of ‘international peace and 
security’ and ‘liberal justice’, a number of factors have resulted in institutional 
fragmentation between the AC-FCNM and ECtHR. Systemic factors including the 
nature of the norms contained in each instrument and the mandates of their respective 
monitoring bodies have the potential to result in fragmentation. However, it is the 
interpretation of the respective missions of these bodies that has resulted in conflicting 
interpretations of MSENs in practice. While the mission of the AC-FCNM is the 
preservation of minority identity, the mission of the ECtHR is the promotion and 
protection of democracy. These missions are not prima facie incompatible and, 
indeed, do not conflict in relation to democratic rights. Yet, the ECtHR has directly 
undermined the mission of the AC-FCNM by permitting States a wide margin of 
appreciation, underpinned by a majoritarian vision of democracy, in cases pertaining 
to the preservation of minority identity. This is inherently problematic as it is 
incompatible with the raison d’être of the FCNM and States are likely to comply with 
the least onerous interpretations of human rights standards. Thus, the ECtHR has the 
potential to reduce compliance with the FCNM and undermine the authority and 
legitimacy of the AC-FCNM.  
Inter-institutional dialogue has been identified as the most viable method of                                                              
128 A.T.F. Lang, ‘Legal Regimes and Professional Knowledges: The International Politics of Regime 
Definition’, in Young (ed.), supra note 3, p. 134.  
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reconciling the competing missions of the ECtHR and AC-FCNM. Such an approach 
does not endeavour to create complete uniformity between the ECtHR and AC-
FCNM, but rather seeks to ensure that both bodies adopt reasoned interpretations of 
MSENs, drawing on the available expertise and seek to justify and explain diverging 
interpretations of MSENs in order to avoid de-legitimising each other. Nonetheless, 
such an approach will require that the ECtHR shift from a majoritarian to pluralist 
vision of democracy in relation to rights pertaining to the preservation of minority 
identity and recognise the expertise of the AC-FCNM, contrary to its hegemonic 
tendencies.  
 
 
 
 
